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  In this paper, a theoretical model is developed to analyze the interactions among 
residential development, land use regulations, and public financial impacts (public 
expenditure and property tax).  A simultaneous equations system with self-selection 
and discrete dependent variables is estimated to determine the interactions for counties 
in the five western states (California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington).  The 
results show that county governments are more likely to impose land use regulations 
when facing rapid land development, high public expenditure and property tax.  The 
land use regulations, in turn, decrease land development, long-run public expenditure, 
and property tax at the cost of higher housing prices and property tax.  During the 
period of 1982￿1992, land use regulations reduced developed areas by 612,800 acres or 
8.8 % of the developed area of five western states in 1992, but increased housing price 
by $5,741 per unit under ￿stringent￿ regulations and $1,319 per unit under ￿low￿ 
regulations.    Because it costs money to develop and implement land use regulations, 
land use regulations increased public expenditure and property tax in the short run, 
during the period of 1982-1987.  However, in the long-run (1982-1992), land use 
regulations actually reduce public expenditure and property taxes because the 
regulations reduce developed areas.  The results also show that land use regulations, 
land development, public expenditure, and property tax all are significantly affected by 
population, geographic location, land quality, housing prices, and the risks and costs of 
development.   
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The role of local land use policies has been examined in a number of studies 
(e.g. Fischel, 1978; Mills, 1979; Henderson, 1980; Shlay and Rossi, 1981; Epple et al., 
1988; McDonald and McMillen, 1998; Levine, 1999; Phillips and Goodstein, 2000).  
However, little evidence is available on which factors motivate land use regulations.  
Because local political processes determine land use regulations, treating regulations as 
exogenous causes a selection bias (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1994).  The endogenous 
nature of zoning regulation was first raised by Davis (1963).  He pointed out the 
different preferences for zoning between the existing homeowners and developers or 
renters.  Rolleston (1987) assessed the link between suburban fiscal environments and 
zoning policies.  She examined the interjurisdictional determinants of restrictive zoning 
and the relationship between residential and nonresidential zoning decisions in 
suburban communities.  Rolleston measured the restrictiveness of residential zoning by 
an ad hoc weighted average of lots in various residential zoning categories.  
Erickson and Wollover (1987) estimated the effects of a number of 
demographic variables on the choice of zoning regulations, but did not account for the 
simultaneous nature of zoning decisions.  Wallace (1988) treated zoning regulations as 
endogenous when evaluating the impact of land-use zoning.  He estimated a logit 
model to correct for selection bias.  McMillen and McDonald (1989, 1991) explored the 
econometric problems involving the measurement of impact of endogenous zoning 
decisions.  They used a two-step estimation technique to derive unbiased estimates of 
the zoning regulations, but excluded demographic variables from consideration.   4
Wallace (1988) and McMillen and McDondald (1989, 1991) did not develop a political 
theory of zoning.  Pogodzinski and Sass (1994) model the political procedure of zoning 
and its implications for measuring the impact of zoning regulations.  They assume that 
zoning regulations are established by maximizing effective political support.  In order 
to measure the effective political support, they consider whether a utility maximizing 
representative voter would support local land-use zoning.   
There are several shortcomings in those previous studies.  First, with the 
exception of Pogodzinski and Sass (1994), land use regulations have not been modeled 
explicitly.  Thus, variables included in land use regulation models were chosen rather 
arbitrarily.  Second, the linkages between land use regulations and land use, public 
expenditure, and property tax were not considered.  These linkages are important 
factors affecting the choice of land use regulations.  Third, previous studies have 
focused on a specific land use regulation.  They have not considered effects of various 
types and degrees of land use regulations.  
In this paper, a theoretical model is developed to analyze the interactions among 
residential development, land use regulations, and public financial impacts (public 
expenditure and property tax).  Specifically, housing markets and socially optimal land 
uses are modeled to identify variables affecting land use, land use regulations, housing 
price, public expenditure, and property tax.  The demand function for land development 
is modeled from a household utility maximization model.  The supply function of land 
development is modeled using an option value approach to accommodate uncertainty 
and irreversibility of land development.  Land use regulations are modeled from a land 
planner￿s perspective, which seeks to maximize a social welfare function.  A  5
polychotomous-choice model with self-selectivity (Lee, 1983) is used to control self-
selection bias in modeling adoption of land use regulations.  A simultaneous equations 
system is estimated to analyze the interactions between land use regulations and land 
use, public expenditure, and property tax. 
 
The Theoretical Model 
Demand for Land Development 
 
Since most land use regulations are imposed at the county level, we consider 
land use decisions within a region.  We assume each region can be divided into sub-
regions that are homogenous in physical and demographic characteristics (Epple and 
Sieg, 1999).  The households in each sub-region are assumed to have homogenous 
preferences and incomes.  The utility of a household depends on their consumption 
choices and the characteristics of the sub-region.  The consumption choices include 
residential lot size ( i n ) and consumption of other goods ( i x ).  The characteristics of the 
sub-region include public expenditure ( i g ), property taxes ( i τ ), physical features ( i Ψ ), 
and demographic characteristics ( i µ ).  The utility function of a household residing in a 
sub-region i is written as  ) , , , , ( i i i i i i g x n U Ψ µ .  The household takes as given the level 
of public expenditure ( i g ), the property tax rate ( i τ ), physical features of the sub-
region ( i Ψ ), and demographic characteristics of the sub-region ( i µ ) to maximize its 
utility function subject to a household budget constraint: 
Max ) , , , , ( i i i i i i g x n U Ψ µ  (1) 
 s.t. i i i i i
x Y n R x p = ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ ) 1 ( τ . (2)  6
where 
x p  is price of other goods,  i R is residential rent, and  i Y  is household income.  
The solution of the maximization problem gives the optimal size of residential lot in the 
sub-region: ) , , , , , , (
*
i i i i i i
x
i i Y g R p n n Ψ = µ τ .  Thus, the total demand for land 
development in year t in the region equals,  
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where i N  is the number of households in sub-region i, and I  is the number of sub-
regions in the region.  Assuming that individual demand functions are homogenous, 
Ψ , , , , , t t t t t Y g R µ τ are the average of residential rent, property tax, government 
expenditure, demographic characteristics, household income, and land quality.   
Supply of Residential Areas 
  The supply of residential areas is determined by developers.  Suppose a 
developer is considering converting a parcel of undeveloped land (e.g. farmland) into 
development.  The developer develops the land to maximize the expected present value 
of profit from development.  Suppose his decision is made in a two-period framework: 
a first period followed by future time horizon compressed into a single second period.  
The developer knows both the rents from farming ) ( 1 F and development ) ( 1 R in the first 
period, but is uncertain about the rents from farming ) ( 2 F and development ) ( 2 R in the 
second period.  We assume that the net gain from development,  2 2 F R − , in the second 
period, takes a normal distribution, N[
2
2,σ R ∆ ] and that the developer will develop his 
land in the second period only if  2 2 F R > .  The following truncated mean values are 
obtained based on the theorem of moments of the truncated normal distribution 
(Greene, 1997 p.949-953):  7
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where  σ µ α / − = , φ  is the probability distribution function of the standard normal, and 
P  is probability that 2 2 F R > .  If the land developer develops the land in the first 
period, the expected net present value is   
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On the other hand, if the land developer waits a period and develops only if the net gain 






+ ∆ = . (7) 
The optimal decision rule for development in the first period is obtained when (6) is set 
to be greater than (7):  
 . ) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 1 R P F R ∆ − − + > α σφ    (8) 
Equation (8) implies that the area of land development in time,t, is a function of 
1 , , + ∆ t t t R F R , and t σ :  ) , , , ( 1 t t t t
s
t R F R N σ + ∆ ∆ , where  1 + ∆ t R  is the expected net return 
from development in the future.  In previous studies of land allocation decisions, 
various socioeconomic, and physical variables have been included to explain land 
allocations to urban, residential, and other uses.  For example, land and demographic 
characteristics and income levels have been used as measures of development pressure 
in previous studies (e.g., Chicoine (1981), Hushak and Sadr (1979), Wall (1981), Alig 
and Healy (1987)).  Hardie and Parks (1989) and Bockstael et al. (1995) found that land 
quality is an important determinant of land use.  Based on these studies, we assume that    8
) , , , , , ( 1 1 t t t t t t t Y F R R R ϕ µ Ψ ∆ = ∆ + +  where t ϕ  is land use regulation.  Thus, the aggregate 
supply of land for development equals:  






t Y F R N N N N N σ ϕ µ Ψ = ∆ + = − − . (9) 
The equilibrium rental rate for housing is obtained when the aggregate supply is set to 
equal the aggregate demand: 
  ) , , , , , , , , , ( 1 − Ψ = t t t t t t t t
x
t t t N g Y F p R R τ µ ϕ σ . (10) 
Land Use Regulations and the Social Welfare Function 
  We assume that the county government (i.e., planning commission) attempts to 
maximize the net value from land use by choosing the optimal level of land 
development in each sub-region:   
  Max
i i i q N τ , ,
) ( ) ( ) ) ( (
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represents total urban area of 
the county.  The first term of equation (11) represents the value of urban land, the 






i N D represents the 
social cost of converting farmland to urban land.  The first order condition for land 
development can be written as 
  ) (
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  9
where λ , the Lagrange multiplier for the budget balance constraint, can be interpreted 
as the marginal social cost of public expenditures.  Equation (12) indicates that land 
ought to be developed where the net rent (development rent minus farmland rent and 
marginal cost of public goods) equals the marginal social cost of public goods. 
  The first order condition for optimal land use is illustrated in figure 1.  The 
socially optimal level of land development,
* N , obtained from equation (12), is where 
the marginal benefit of development equals the marginal cost of development.  
However, the developed area under the market equilibrium can be greater or less than 
the socially optimal level of land development, resulting in a social welfare loss.  If the 
developed area under the market equilibrium
e
l N  is less than the socially optimal level 
* N , the welfare loss is the area abc.  If the developed area under the market 
equilibrium is 
e
h N , the welfare loss is the area ade.  In both cases, a county government 
can reduce the welfare loss by shifting the market equilibrium land use toward the 
socially optimal land use in the form of land use regulations.  A county government can 
encourage development by reducing land use regulations and discourage development 
by imposing more stringent land use regulations.  Thus, the probability that land use 
regulations will be imposed depends on the difference between the left and right hand 
sides of (12), which is   
  ) , , , , , , , , , ( Pr 1
*
− Ψ = t t t t t t t t
x
t t t N D g Y F p µ τ σ ϕ . (13) 
From the first order condition of the county government￿s maximization problem, we 
obtain the government expenditure and property tax functions: 
             ) , , , , , , , , , ( 1
*
− Ψ = t t t t t t t t
x
t t t N D Y F p g g τ µ ϕ σ ,   (14)  10
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which, together with the public budget constraint, determine the optimal level of public 
expenditure and property taxes. 
 
The Empirical Model 
  In the last section, we analyzed the theoretical interrelationships between land 
use, land use regulations, and their fiscal impacts.  In this section, we present an 
empirical model of these interrelationships.  Specifically, the interrelationships are 
represented by the following simultaneous equations system with self-selection and 
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where  j = 1, 2, 3, 4 represents the four degrees of land use regulations as defined in table 1, 








t ε ε ε ε
τ , , , are 
random error terms.   
  The degree of land use regulations is defined based on a comprehensive survey of 
land use regulations in each county in five western states (California, Idaho, Nevada, 
Oregon, and Washington).  From the survey, we identified the 20 most important land use 
regulations.  Survey respondents were asked to evaluate the level of effectiveness of each  11
regulation on a scale of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 with 1 being not effective and 5 being most 
effective.  The sum of the level of effectiveness for all regulations in a county is defined as 
an index of regulatory intensity.  For example, a county with 20 land use regulations each 
with level of effectiveness of 5, would have an index of 100.  Counties with indexes greater 
than 60 are classified as having ￿stringent land use regulations￿, counties with indexes 
greater than 30 and equal to or less than 60 are classified as having ￿moderate land use 
regulations￿, counties with indexes greater than 0 and equal to or less than 30 are classified 
as having ￿low land use regulations￿, and counties without any land use regulations are 
defined as ￿no land use regulations￿.   
  The equation system (16-20) is an extension of the polychotomous-choice 
selectivity model as described in Lee (1983) and applied to agricultural policy analysis in 
Wu and Babcock (1998).  When any two equations of land demand, land supply, and 
housing price are estimated, the other one would be determined.  Here we choose to 
estimate the land supply and housing price equations.    
Maddala (1983, p. 242-245) describes a two-stage technique for estimating a 
simultaneous model with discrete dependent variables.  In the first stage, we estimate 
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We then use the predicted value of  g R ￿ , ￿ , ￿ τ  to estimate the multinomial logit model in 
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t r P ￿ / )] r P ￿ ( [ ￿ 1 − Φ ≡ φ λ ,  j  = 1, 2, 3, 4.  The 
j
t λ ￿  reflects 
correction of self-selection bias (Lee, 1983).  It is included in the model because 
counties that adopt land use regulations may behave differently from a randomly 
selected county with the same characteristics.     
In the second stage, the parameters in the structural equations are determined by 
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Since the coefficients of the multinomial logit model are difficult to interpret, the 
marginal effects of explanatory variables on the degree of regulation are determined 
using     
) Pr ( Pr
Pr 3
1











This model can be used to estimate the effects of alternative degrees of land use 
regulations on land development, housing price, public expenditure, and property tax.  
Consider the public expenditure of a county with and without land use regulations, the 
expected change in public expenditure due to the adoption of level of land use 
regulation  j  is:    13
  run short
j I g E j I g E − = − = )] 4 | ( ) | ( [
4   (30)      
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where I = 4 denotes no land use regulations in the county.  The first bracket in the right 
hand side of equation (30) is the expected change in public expenditure resulting from 
adoption of level of land use regulation  j .  The remaining term accounts for self-
selection.   
            The expected change in public expenditure resulting from adoption of land 
regulations on housing price, public expenditure, and property taxes in a single-period 
frame is defined as the short-run effect and is estimated using equation (30).  The 
expected changes in public expenditure from adoption of land use regulations that take 
into account the effect of changes in developed area is defined as the long-run effect 
and it is estimated using equation (31): 
run long
j I g E j I g E − = − = )] 4 | ( ) | ( [
4  (31) 
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where
’
t Z  is vector that includes every variable in  t Z except , 1 − t N
’
2
j π  and 
j
Nt 1 2 − π are the 
estimated coefficients on 
’
t Z  and  , 1 − t N  and 
*
1 − t N  is the acres of land that would be 
developed without any land use regulation.  The expected changes in housing price, 
land development, and property taxes due to adoption of different degree of land use 
regulation can be similarly analyzed. 
 
Data 
  The study area includes five western states (California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, 
and Washington) of the Unites States.  The data on land use was taken from the 1982,  14
1987, and 1992 Natural Resource Inventories (NRI)
1.  The NRI collected land use data 
at 800,000 randomly selected sites across the continental United States and divided land 
use into twelve major categories (cultivated cropland, non-cultivated cropland, 
pastureland, rangeland, forestland, urban and built-up land, and six other categories).  
In this study, cultivated cropland, non-cultivated cropland, pastureland, and rangeland 
are categorized as farmland and urban and built-up land is categorized as urban land.  
The NRI survey assigns a weight called an expansion factor or ￿X￿ factor to each site 
in the sample to determine the number of acres each sample site represents.  The sum of 
this value for all sites in a county equals the total county acreage.   
  The expected variances of farm profit and new housing value were used to 
measure the risk associated with farming and development.  These variances were 
estimated using 









t t t EB B VB ,   (32) 
where   t VB  = the expected variance of farm profit or new housing value in year t, t= 
1982, 1987, 
  t B = the farm profit or the value of new housing units in year t, 
A comprehensive land use policy survey was conducted to obtain information 
on county land use regulations in the five western states.  The survey, conducted 
between August and October of 1999, was sent to all county land use planners or 
equivalent positions in the five states.  The overall response rate was 69%.  Counties of 
Washington had the highest response rate (87%), followed by Oregon (78%), Nevada 
(65 %), California (60%), and Idaho (57%).   
                                                 
1 The 1997 NRI has not been released due to technical problems.   15
The survey results show that the most important land use policy goal of Nevada 
counties was the promotion of industrial and commercial investment, while the counties 
in other states were more concerned about the conservation of farmland, forestland, and 
natural areas.  All counties expressed a serious concern about urbanization.  A county 
comprehensive plan had been enacted in almost all of the counties in the five states 
when the survey was conducted, however, the timing of the initial enactment varied 
across counties.  Extra territorial planning and zoning were popular in Idaho, urban 
growth boundaries were popular in Oregon and Washington.  Agricultural, residential, 
forestry, conservation, open space, and steep slope zonings were popular throughout the 
states, whereas performance zoning was used only in a limited number of counties.  
Specification of minimum parcel sizes was popular in many counties, limits on 
maximum parcel sizes was not.   
Developer exaction and dedication was the most popular land acquisition 
technique in many counties.  Fee simple purchase and agricultural districts were 
especially popular in California.  Preferential property taxation for farmland and 
forestland were the most popular incentive-based management techniques.  Special 
assessments were popular in Oregon, Washington, and California.   
Environmental impact assessments were popular in Washington and California.  
Regional fair sharing was especially popular in California.  The planners predicted a 
high possibility of conversion from farmland to residential land, especially in Idaho and 
Nevada.  Counties in California spent the largest amount of money on planning, while 
counties in Idaho spent the least amount.  However, the average share of money spent 
on planning out of general fund for the entire county budget remained fairly close in the  16
five states.  Planners in Oregon and Washington felt that the State governments had 
strong influence on land use regulations, whereas planners in California, Idaho, and 
Nevada felt strong influences from non-government organizations.  
  Land quality and location variables in the empirical models, included the 
average land capability class and distance to the closest metropolitan center (population 
≥  100,000).  The weighted average of land capability classes was calculated for each 
county using the survey records of the land capability class at each NRI site.  The 
Natural Resources Conservation Service divided land capability into eight classes, with 
1 being the best quality land and 8 being the worst quality land.  Location was 
calculated as the distance from the geographical center of each county (defined as the 
cross point of the medium latitude and longitude) to the center of the closest 
metropolitan area (defined as a city with more than 100,000 people).  The data on the 
latitude and longitude of the geographical center of each county and the closest 
metropolitan area were collected from the National Association of Counties.  The 
website, www.indo.com/distance was used to measure the distances.   
  Data on the average value of new housing units, construction cost, income, 
population, property tax, and public expenditure were obtained from the Census 
Bureau￿s ￿USA counties 1998￿.  Average farm profit data was obtained from the 
Census Bureau￿s ￿Regional Economic Information System: 1969-1997￿.  Both the farm 
profit and the average value of new housing units are adjusted by the consumer price 
index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The summary of variables is shown in table 
2. 
  17
Estimation Results and Discussion 
Factors Affecting Adoption of Land Use Regulations 
  Parameter estimates for the multinomial logit model of land use regulations are 
presented in table 3.  The model correctly predicts the level of land use regulation for 
67 % of counties.  The marginal effects of alternative variables on the intensity of land 
use regulations are shown in table 4.  Six of twelve marginal effects are statistically 
significant at the 5 % level for counties with ￿stringent￿ land use regulations.  Four of 
twelve coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 % level for counties with 
￿moderate￿ and ￿low￿ land use regulation indexes.  The marginal effects of all twelve 
variables increase with the index of land use regulations.  Although the marginal effects 
are less significant for counties with a lower land use regulation index, their signs are 
not affected.   
  Counties with higher farm profit adopted land use regulations more frequently.  
This reflects the economic incentive of land use regulations against farmland 
development.  Farmers with high farm profit are more willing to support land use 
regulations preserving their farmland.  Population increases the pressure for adopting 
land use regulations.  Land use regulations are also more frequently adopted by 
counties with higher household income under stringent and moderate levels of 
regulations.  These population and income results are consistent with those found by 
Erickson and Wollover (1987), who estimated the effects of a number of demographic 
variables on the adoption of zoning regulations.   
Counties closer to metropolitan centers are more likely to enact land use 
regulations.  This result is expected because counties closer to metropolitan centers tend  18
to have more land use conflicts.  Land use regulations are more likely to be adopted in 
counties with smaller variances in farm profit and larger variances in new housing 
price.  This suggests that the greater the risk associated with new housing price 
compare with the risk associated with farming, the more likely developers accept land 
use regulations.  In addition, county governments may use regulations to reduce 
variations in housing prices.   
Adoption rates of land use regulations are higher in counties with high public 
expenditures and property taxes.  This provides empirical evidence that high public 
expenditures and property tax encourage county governments to impose land use 
regulations to control government expenditures.  Finally, land use regulations are more 
frequently adopted in the counties with a large share of developed areas.  This suggests 
that development pressure promotes county governments to take actions to control land 
development.    
The Effects of Land Use Regulations          
  Tables 5-8 present the estimated parameters for the land supply equation, the 
housing price equation, the public expenditure equation, and the property tax equation 
under alternative levels of land use regulations.  There is evidence that self-selection 
occurred in the adoption of land use regulations.  The coefficient of 
j λ  is statistically 
significant at the 5 % level in the equations of land supply, housing price, public 
expenditure, and property tax for stringent level of regulations.  It is also statistically 
significant at the 10 % level in those equations for counties with moderate, low, and no 
land use regulations.  These results indicate that the land use regulations do not have 
the same effects on non-adopters, should they choose to adopt, as it does on adopters.   19
The parameter estimates for counties with stringent land use regulations are generally 
greater than for those with less stringent regulations in all four equations.  This reflects 
that under stringent land use regulations, land supply, housing price, public 
expenditure, and property tax are more sensitive to variables affecting them.   
  The results in table 5 indicate that developers are more likely to develop in 
counties with higher land quality, higher income, and larger population.  They develop 
more land in counties closer to metropolitan areas.  Higher housing prices increase the 
supply of housing and thus land development; however, housing supply is negatively 
correlated with farm profit since farm profit is an opportunity cost of land development.  
The positive coefficients on variance of farm profit and negative coefficients on 
variance of new housing prices in the land supply equations indicate that developers are 
more likely to develop when facing high risks and uncertainties of farm profit and less 
likely to develop when facing high risks and uncertainties of housing price. 
            Parameter estimates for the housing price equation are shown in table 6.  Seven 
of twelve coefficients under stringent regulation are statistically significant at the 5 % 
level.  Only two of twelve coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 % level under 
no regulation.  The coefficients on the distance to a metropolitan center and property 
taxes were not statistically significant at the 10% level under no regulation but they 
were statistically significant at the 5 % level under stringent regulations.  This suggests 
that counties with stringent regulations are likely to be located near a metropolitan 
center where housing prices are significantly affected by both the distance to the 
metropolitan center and property taxes.    20
            Housing prices tend to be higher in counties with higher land quality, higher 
income, larger population, and a larger variance of farm profit but tend to be lower in 
counties with a large variance of housing prices.  Housing prices increase with the 
consumer price index as the prices of non-housing goods and housing prices tend to 
move in the same direction.  Counties with higher development densities tend to have 
higher housing prices, but counties with higher property tax per capita tend to have 
lower housing prices.  Housing prices tend to be higher in counties with a large public 
expenditure.  This may reflect that counties with a large public expenditure can provide 
better public service.    
  Parameter estimates for the public expenditure equations are shown in table 7.  
Overall, the model fits the data well, with high R-squares.  Most variables are 
statistically significant at the 10 % level.  Public expenditure is positively correlated 
with income and population.  Counties with high construction costs and/or high 
development densities tend to have higher levels of public expenditure.  As expected, 
the higher the property tax, the larger the public expenditure.            
  Parameter estimates for the property tax equations are shown in table 8.   
The R-square and the magnitude of coefficients are consistently larger under the 
stringent regulations than under the other degrees of regulations.  The coefficients of 
the variables in the property tax equation have the same signs as their coefficients in the 
public expenditure equations except variance of farm profit reflecting the balance 
budget constraint faced by county governments. 
  Equations (30) and (31) can be used to further explore how the intensity of land 
regulations affects land development, housing prices, public expenditure, and property  21
tax.  The short-run effects for period 1982-1987 and long-run effects for period 1982-
1992 are shown in Tables 9 and 10, respectively.  The effects of land use regulations 
increase with the degree of regulation.  In counties with ￿stringent￿ land use 
regulations, the percent of developed area is reduced by 0.29 % in the five western 
states in the long-run.  This means that for a county with 100 squares mile, the stringent 
regulations reduce the developed area by 0.29 squares mile.  The total land area in all 
counties with stringent regulations in the five western states is 85,560,500 acres.  By 
1992, 2,909,100 acres, or 3.4 % were developed.  If land use regulations had not been 
imposed in those counties, 3.79 % of total land area would have been developed.  Thus, 
regulations in those counties save 248,100 acres of land from development, which is 
8.5 % of developed area in 1992.   
            In counties with ￿moderate￿ regulations, the percent of developed area is 
reduced by 0.22 % in the five western states in the long run.  The total land area in all 
counties with moderate regulations in the five western states is 113,183,300 acres.  By 
1992, 2,829,600 acres, or 2.5 % were developed.  If land use regulations had not been 
imposed in those counties, 2.72 % of total land area would have been developed.  Thus, 
regulations in those counties saved 249,000 acres of land from development, which is 
8.8 % of developed area in 1992.  Similarly in counties with ￿low￿ regulations, the 
percent of developed area is reduced by 0.13 %.  The total land area in all counties with 
some regulations in the five western states is 89,026,500 acres.  By 1992, 1,826,800 
acres, or 1.7 % were developed.  If land use regulations had not been imposed in those 
counties, 1.83 % of total land area would have been developed.  Thus, regulations in  22
those counties save 115,700 acres of land from development, which is 6.3 % of 
developed area in 1992.   
            All land use regulations in the five western states saved an estimated total of 
458,000 acres (6.6 % of developed area in 1992) in the short-run and 612,800 acres (8.8 
% of developed area in 1992) in the long-run.  However, in counties with the most 
stringent land use regulations, the average new housing price increased by $5,741 per 
unit in the long-run.  The average new housing price was $146,000 in 1982, thus the 
stringent land use regulations increased new housing prices by 3.9 % compared to no 
land use regulations.   
            Under stringent regulations, public expenditure increased by the largest amount 
($92 per capita) in the short-run.  The average public expenditure was $1,320 per capita 
in 1982, thus the stringent regulations increased public expenditure by 7.0 % in the 
short-run.  However, in the long-run, land use regulations reduced public expenditure 
by $49 per capita under stringent regulations, a 3.7 % decrease compared to no 
regulations.  Property tax also increased by the largest amount ($29 per capita) under 
the stringent regulation in the short-run.  However, in the long-run, land use regulations 
reduced property tax by $16 per capita under stringent regulation.   
            The different short-run vs. long-run effects on public expenditure and property 
taxes suggest that in the short-run, county governments raise property taxes to cover the 
increased public expenditure needed to develop and implement land use regulations, 
whereas, in the long-run land use regulations reduce public expenditure and property 
taxes by reducing the extent of developed areas.  In summary, in the long-run land use 
regulation reduced the amount of land developed, long-run public expenditure, and  23
property tax; however, not without higher long-run housing prices, and short-run 
increases in public expenditure and property tax.    
 
Conclusions 
  Measuring effects of land use regulations is becoming increasingly important as 
more communities exercise land use regulations.  Previous studies on land use 
regulations have focused on a single land use regulation, treating all others as given and 
exogenously determined.  They also have neglected interactions among residential 
development, land use regulations, and public finance (public expenditure and property 
tax).  In this study a simultaneous equations system with self-selection and discrete 
dependent variables is used to estimate adoption decisions of land use regulations and 
their impacts on land use, public expenditure, and property tax.   
  The method is applied to land use regulation decisions in five western states 
using data from a comprehensive survey on land use regulations, the 1982, 1987, and 
1992 National Resources Inventories, and other USDA publications.  The results 
indicate that conversion of farmland and open space to development along with high 
public expenditure and property taxes promote county governments to impose more 
stringent land use regulations.  More stringent land use regulations, in turn, reduce land 
development, long-run public expenditure, and property tax; however, not without 
higher long-run housing prices and short-run increases in public expenditure and 
property tax.  The results also show that land use regulations, land development, public 
expenditure, and property tax all are significantly affected by population, geographic 
location, land quality, housing rent, and risks and costs of development.    24
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Table 1.  The Intensity of Land Use Regulation in the Five Western States 
Category  Index of intensity of land use regulations (I)  % of Counties 
Stringent I  ≥  60  31 % 
Moderate 30  ≤  I < 60  33 % 
Low  0 < I < 30   25 % 
No Regulations  0  11 % 




Table 2. Definition of Variables 











Percent of total land developed (%)  
New housing price   159.0  91.5  Value of private new housing units ($1,000) 
Property tax  436.0  67.0  Property tax per capita ($) 
Public expenditure 
 








Farm profit per acre ($)  
Population     0.2  0.9  Population per acre 
Income  15.6  4.0  Income per capita ($ 1,000) 
Land capability class  5.2  0.9  Weighted average of land capability class 
with 1 being the best land and 8 being the 
worst land 
Distance to the closest 
metropolitan center  
80.0  52.6  Distance from the geographic center of a 
county to the closest metropolitan center 
(population ≥  100,000) (mile) 
Construction cost   75.0  28.8  Construction cost as recorded on the 
building permit ($1,000) 
Consumer price index  127.0  13.0  Consumer price index 
Variance of farm profit  169.3  1,006.1  Variance of farm profit at the beginning of 
the period 
Variance of new housing 
value 
 
353.5  1,949.1  Variance of housing value at the beginning 




Table 3.  Parameter Estimates for the Multinomial Logit Model of Land Use 
Regulation Intensity 


























































































































2                                                                                                                          0.86 
Likelihood ratio test statistic                                                                                              231 
Correct predictions of land use regulation                                                                        67% 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; 
* indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 % level; 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level.  28
Table 4.  The Marginal Effects of Alternative Variables on the Intensity of Land 
Use Regulation 
Variable Stringent  Moderate  Low 













































































































Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; 
* indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 % level; 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level. 
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Table 5.  Parameter Estimates for the Supply Equation of Land Development 
under Different Levels of Land Use Regulation Intensity  
Variable Stringent  Moderate  Low  None 





















































































Distance to the closest 





































2 R   0.89 0.86  0.84  0.77 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; 
* indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 % level; 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level. 
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Table 6.  Parameter Estimates for the Housing Price Equation under Different 
Levels of Land Use Regulation Intensity  


























































































































Distance to the closest 





































2 R   0.79 0.71 0.69 0.67 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; 
* indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 % level; 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level.  31
Table 7.  Parameter Estimates for the Public Expenditure Equation under 
Different Levels of Land Use Regulation Intensity  













Percent of developed area 








































































































































2 R   0.99 0.95 0.93 0.92 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; 
* indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 % level; 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level. 
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Table 8.  Parameter Estimates for the Property Tax Equation under Different 
Levels of Land Use Regulation Intensity 





















































































































































2 R   0.90 0.81 0.79 0.73 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; 
* indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 % level; 




Table 9. The Estimated Short-Run Effects of Land Use Regulation Intensity on 
Land Development, Housing Price, Public Expenditure, and Property Tax 
between 1982 and 1987 
Regulation 
intensity 
Percent of total 










































Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; 
* indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 % level; 





Table 10. The Estimated Long-Run Effects of Land Use Regulation Intensity on 
Land Development, Housing Price, Public Expenditure, and Property Tax 
between 1982 and 1992 
Regulation 
intensity 
Percent of total 











































Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; 
* indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 % level; 



























   
         Figure 1. Socially Optimal and Market Equilibrium Land Use  